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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-2517

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAMFILO DACUA,
a/k/a MICHAEL MONTOYA
Pamfilo Dacua,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 04-cr-00774
(Honorable Berle M. Schiller)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 27, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and ALARCÓN*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 24, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

*

The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit, sitting by designation.

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Pamfilo Dacua appeals his criminal sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We will affirm.
On November 19, 2003, Dacua informed the FBI that he had been approached by
an individual, Ahmed, who sought his assistance in smuggling VX, a nerve agent, into the
United States. In reality, no such plot existed. Dacua fabricated the story in the hopes of
obtaining a place in the witness protection program for his “assistance” in revealing the
alleged VX plot. Dacua used the name of a real person, lending some credibility to his
story. To further his scheme, Dacua set up “meetings” with the fictitious Ahmed and
another invented person, Didi, a drug source allegedly provided by Ahmed. The FBI
prepped Dacua for each meeting, outfitted him with a body recorder, and conducted
surveillance, but all to no avail. Neither Ahmed nor Didi showed up. Dacua also
recruited friends to play the parts of Didi and Ahmed in several scripted recordings, made
for the benefit of the agents he hoped to deceive.
In late December 2003, the FBI confronted Dacua and advised him of their doubts
about the veracity of his story. Dacua continued to lie to the FBI, inventing further facts
in support of his scheme. But later, when the authorities confronted Dacua again, he
confessed to having fabricated the story for his own interests.
On December 9, 2004, Dacua was charged with three counts of making false
statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). At the plea colloquy, Dacua pleaded
guilty to all counts, and admitted to the facts as presented by the government. The
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presentence report (PSR) designated an adjusted offense level of 10 and a criminal history
score of VI — adding two points for Dacua’s leadership role in recruiting two people to
assist in making the fake recordings, and two more points for obstruction of justice based
on Dacua’s lies to the FBI in December 2003, when he was first confronted about his
story. In light of the obstruction of justice recommendation, the Probation Office
declined to recommend a reduction for Dacua’s eventual acceptance of responsibility.
Dacua made several objections to the PSR, including to the obstruction of justice
and leadership role adjustments. He also asserted entitlement to a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. Finally, he filed a motion for downward departure based on
his alleged cooperation with state authorities in a separate homicide case. Dacua asserted
his testimony in the state trial led to a double murder conviction, although he presented no
witnesses to bolster this claim.1
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court awarded upward adjustments for
obstruction of justice and leadership role, but granted Dacua’s request for credit for
acceptance of responsibility. The District Court also denied Dacua’s motion for a
downward departure. As a result, the court placed Dacua at a total offense level of 8,
with a criminal history score of VI, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24
months. The government urged the court to sentence Dacua at the high end of the range,
in view of Dacua’s exploitation of a particularly sensitive issue of national concern

1

Dacua’s counsel asserted he subpoenaed a detective involved in the state case, but the
detective did not appear to support the motion.
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(terrorism), the danger he caused by implicating real individuals in his plot, and the
resources expended in responding to his fabricated story. The District Court sentenced
Dacua to 22-months’ imprisonment, stating the sentence reflected the considerations
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court noted it considered Dacua’s cooperation in the
state case in declining to sentence him at the very top of the advisory guidelines range.
On appeal, Dacua challenged the District Court’s decisions declining to depart
downward for cooperation and assessing the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction
of justice.2 The government asserted we did not have jurisdiction to review either the
reasonableness of Dacua’s sentence or the District Court’s decision not to depart. We
requested further briefing from the parties to determine the impact of this Court’s decision
in United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006), on Dacua’s appeal.
In response, the government concedes (as it must) our jurisdiction to review
Dacua’s sentence for reasonableness under Cooper, 437 F.3d at 327, although it contends
we must review for plain error because Dacua did not object to his sentence as
unreasonable at trial. This argument is meritless. Dacua raised before the District Court
the particular grounds he now asserts justify a lighter sentence. This is all that is required
under Cooper. Id. at 329 (noting a sentence may be found unreasonable “if at sentencing
either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized legal merit
(provided it has a factual basis) and the court fails to address it”) (quotation omitted).

2

Dacua does not challenge on appeal the leadership role adjustment to his sentence.
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Dacua now urges us to remand for re-sentencing because it is not clear from the
record “if the District Court granted the downward departure motion.” (Appellant’s
Letter Br. 2.) There is no confusion in the record on this point. The District Court
expressly denied the downward departure motion, but took Dacua’s cooperation into
account in imposing sentence. (App. 78, 80.)
We also reject Dacua’s original challenges to the District Court’s downward
departure and obstruction of justice decisions. We do not have jurisdiction to review a
district court’s decision not to depart downward. See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 322–33. And
Dacua’s argument that his “stupidity” at the December 2003 interview, as he describes it,
rebuts the obstruction of justice adjustment is meritless. When confronted by the FBI,
Dacua did more than deny his previous crimes, he fabricated additional facts in
furtherance of his scheme.
The District Court’s sentence was not unreasonable. The court engaged in a
thorough inquiry into the facts of Dacua’s case. Accordingly, we will affirm the
judgment of sentence.
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